- Title: An Experimental Test of the Lucas Asset Pricing Model (Download)
(Co)Authors: Sean Crockett
More info » Title: An Experimental Test of the Lucas Asset Pricing Model
Abstract:We implement a dynamic asset pricing experiment in the spirit of Lucas (1978) with storable assets and non-storable cash. In one treatment we impose diminishing marginal returns to cash to incentivize consumption-smoothing across periods, while in a second treatment there is no induced motive for trade. In the former case subjects smooth consumption, and assets trade at a discount relative to the risk-neutral fundamental price. This under-pricing is a departure from the `bubbles` observed in the experimental asset pricing experiments of Smith et al. (1988). In our second treatment with no induced motive for trade, assets trade at a premium relative to expected value and shareholdings are highly concentrated.
Creation Date:
02/2010
Revision Date:
05/2013
JEL Codes:
C90, D51, D91, G12
- Title: All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms (Download)
(Co)Authors: Alexander Matros
More info » Title: All-Pay Auctions vs. Lotteries as Provisional Fixed-Prize Fundraising Mechanisms
Abstract:We study two provisional fixed-prize mechanisms for funding public goods: an all-pay auction and a lottery. In our setting, the public good is provided only if the participants' contributions are greater than the fixed-prize value; otherwise contributions are refunded. We prove that in this provisional fixed prize setting, lotteries can outperform all-pay auctions
in terms of expected public good provision. Specifically, we state conditions under which the provisional fixed prize all-pay auction mechanism generates zero public good provision, while the provisional fixed prize
lottery mechanism generates positive public good provision. We test these predictions in a laboratory experiment where we vary the number of participants, the marginal per capita return (mpcr) on the public good and
the mechanism for awarding the prize, either a lottery or an all-pay auction. Consistent with the theory, we find that the mpcr matters for contribution amounts under the lottery mechanism. However, inconsistent with
the theory bids are always significantly higher than predicted and there is no significant difference in public good contributions under either mechanism. We suggest how a non-expected utility approach involving probability weighting can help to explain over-bidding in our experiment.
Creation Date:
11/2011
Revision Date:
10/2012
JEL Codes:
C72, D44, H41
- Title: Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research (Download)
More info » Title: Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research
Abstract:This chapter surveys laboratory experiments addressing macroeconomic phenomena. The first part focuses on experimental tests of the microfoundations of macroeconomic models discussing laboratory studies of
intertemporal consumption/savings decisions, time (in)consistency of
preferences and rational expectations. Part two explores coordination
problems of interest to macroeconomists and mechanisms for resolving these
problems. Part three looks at experiments in specific macroeconomic sectors
including monetary economics, labor economics, international economics as
well-as large scale, multi-sector models that combine several sectors
simultaneously. The final section addresses experimental tests of
macroeconomic policy issues.
Creation Date:
02/2008
Revision Date:
08/2012
JEL Codes:
C9, E0
- Title: Learning, Forecasting and Optimizing: An Experimental Study (Download)
(Co)Authors: Te Bao, Cars Hommes
More info » Title: Learning, Forecasting and Optimizing: An Experimental Study
Abstract:Rational Expectations (RE) models have two crucial dimensions: 1) agents correctly forecast future prices given all available information, and 2) given expectations, agents solve optimization problems and these solutions in turn determine actual price realizations. Experimental testing of such models typically focuses on only one of these two dimensions. In this paper we consider both forecasting and optimization decisions in an experimental cobweb economy. We report results from four experimental treatments: 1) subjects form forecasts only, 2) subjects determine quantity only (solve an optimization problem), 3) they do both and 4) they are paired in teams and one member is assigned the forecasting role while the other is assigned the optimization task. All treatments converge to Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE), but at very different speeds. We observe that performance is the best in treatment 1) and worst in the treatment 3). We further find that most subjects use adaptive rules to forecast prices. Given a price forecast, subjects are less likely to make conditionally optimal production decisions in treatment 3) where the forecast is made by themselves, than in treatment 4) where the forecast is made by the other member of their team, which suggests that "two heads are better than one" in finding REE.
Creation Date:
10/2011
Revision Date:
07/2012
JEL Codes:
C91, C92, D83, D84
- Title: Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences (Download)
(Co)Authors: Felix Munoz-Garcia
More info » Title: Cooperation and Signaling with Uncertain Social Preferences
Abstract:This paper investigates incomplete information and signaling about players` inequity aversion in the simultaneous and sequential-move Prisoner`s Dilemma game. We show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained where a player unconcerned about inequity aversion initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player concerned about inequity in payoffs. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in the last period of their interaction, at which time the unconcerned player takes the opportunity to defect, i.e., he `backstabs` the uninformed player. Despite this last-minute defection, our results show that the introduction of incomplete information can actually lead to a Pareto improvement under certain conditions. We then connect the predictions of this `backstabbing` equilibrium with frequently observed endgame behavior in finitely-repeated experiments.
Creation Date:
03/2012
Revision Date:
03/2012
JEL Codes:
C72, C73, D82
- Title: Real-Time, Adaptive Learning via Parameterized Expectations (Download)
(Co)Authors: Michele Berardi
More info » Title: Real-Time, Adaptive Learning via Parameterized Expectations
Abstract:We explore real time, adaptive nonlinear learning dynamics in stochastic macroeconomic
systems. Rather than linearizing nonlinear Euler equations where expectations play a role around a steady state, we instead approximate the nonlinear expected values
using the method of parameterized expectations. Further we suppose that these
approximated expectations are updated in real time as new data become available. We
argue that this method of real-time parameterized expectations learning provides a plausible alternative to real-time adaptive learning dynamics under linearized versions of the same nonlinear system and we provide a comparison of the two approaches.
Creation Date:
07/2010
Revision Date:
02/2012
JEL Codes:
C62, D83
- Title: Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting: An Experimental Study (Download)
(Co)Authors: Sourav Bhattacharya, Sun-Tak Kim
More info » Title: Compulsory versus Voluntary Voting: An Experimental Study
Abstract:We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting mechanisms. Theory predicts that these different mechanisms have important implications both for the sincerity of voting decisions and for the participation decisions of voters, and we find strong support for these
theoretical predictions in our experimental data. Voters are able to adapt the sincerity of their votes or their participation decisions to the different voting mechanisms in such a way as to make the efficiency differences between these mechanisms negligible. We argue that this finding may account for the co-existence of these two voting mechanisms in nature.
Creation Date:
05/2012
Revision Date:
01/2012
JEL Codes:
C92, D72, D83.
- Title: Group Size and Cooperation Among Strangers (Download)
(Co)Authors: Huan Xie
More info » Title: Group Size and Cooperation Among Strangers
Abstract:We study how group size affects cooperation in an infinitely repeated n-player Prisoner`s Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n ≤ M are randomly and anonymously matched from a fixed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We provide conditions for which the contagious strategy (Kandori, 1992) sustains a social norm of cooperation among all M players. Our main finding is that if agents are sufficiently patient, a social norm of society-wide cooperation becomes easier to sustain under the contagious strategy as n → M.
Creation Date:
08/2012
Revision Date:
01/2012
JEL Codes:
C72, C73, C78, Z13.
- Title: On the Use of Fines and Lottery Prizes to Increase Voter Turnout (Download)
(Co)Authors: Alexander Matros
More info » Title: On the Use of Fines and Lottery Prizes to Increase Voter Turnout
Abstract:We consider implementation issues regarding two mechanisms that have been used to increase voter turnout in elections: fines and lotteries. We focus on the amount of the fine or lottery prize needed to achieve full participation. We then propose a combined, self-financing mechanism by which the fines imposed on non-participants are used to finance the prize that is awarded by lottery to one of the individuals choosing to participate in voting. We argue that this combined mechanism has some advantages over the other two mechanisms and merits consideration.
Creation Date:
08/2012
Revision Date:
01/2012
- Title: Gift Exchange versus Monetary Exchange: Theory and Evidence (Download)
(Co)Authors: Daniela Puzzello
More info » Title: Gift Exchange versus Monetary Exchange: Theory and Evidence
Abstract:This paper reports findings from an experiment that implements the Lagos-Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange. We find that subjects generally avoid the autarkic equilibrium of that model and make trading
decisions consistent with the model`s monetary equilibrium. Aliprantis,
Camera and Puzzello (ACP, 2007) show that providing periodic access to centralized markets as in the Lagos and Wright framework may facilitate the sustainability of social norms of gift exchange, thus rendering money
inessential in decentralized exchange. We also explore this hypothesis by replacing the centralized market of the Lagos-Wright model with a version of the centralized market of ACP`s model. We find that the essentiality of money is not threatened by the presence of centralized meetings. Indeed, the efficiency of allocations is significantly higher in the environment with
money than without money, suggesting that money plays a role as an efficiency enhancing coordination device.
Creation Date:
11/2011
Revision Date:
11/2011
- Title: Are Dynamically Inefficient Equilibria Learnable? (Download)
(Co)Authors: Wei Xiao
More info » Title: Are Dynamically Inefficient Equilibria Learnable?
Abstract:We consider the stability under adaptive learning dynamics of steady state equilibria in Diamond`s (1965) overlapping generations growth model with capital and money. Interior steady state equilibria of this model can be either dynamically inefficient or dynamically efficient. We show that a
necessary condition for an equilibrium of this model to be stable under adaptive learning is that the equilibrium is dynamically efficient. In other words, adaptive learning can be used as a selection criterion to exclude dynamically inefficient equilibria. We also provide conditions under which a dynamically efficient equilibrium of this model involving the use of both capital and money will be stable under adaptive learning dynamics.
Creation Date:
07/2011
Revision Date:
01/2011
JEL Codes:
D83, E43, E52.