

DIEGO LAMÉ

CONTACT INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, University of Pittsburgh, expected completion date: April 2019. Thesis Title: “Essays on Information and Feedback Effects”
Thesis Committee: Prof. Alistair Wilson (Chair), Prof. David Huffman, Prof. Rania Ghileb, Prof. Alex Imas.

M.A. Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 2013.
B.A. Economics, Universidad ORT Uruguay, 2011.

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Primary Fields: Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Information Economics.
Secondary Fields: Labor Economics, Decision Theory.

PUBLICATIONS

Lessons from participation in a web-based substance use preventive program in Uruguay (with Ana Balsa and Nestor Gandelman) *Journal of Child & Adolescent Substance Abuse* 23.2 (2014): 91-100.

The slider task: an example of restricted inference on incentive effects (with Felipe Araujo, Erin Carbone, Lynn Conell-Price, Marli Dunietz, Ania Jaroszewicz, Rachel Landsman, Lise Vesterlund, Stephanie Wang, and Alistair Wilson) *Journal of the Economic Science Association* 2.1 (2016): 1-12.

WORKING PAPERS

“[The Effect of Subjective Information in Hiring Decisions](#)” (*Job Market Paper*)
(Joint with Mark Azic)

“[Preference reversals between one-shot and repeated decisions: The case of regret](#)” (joint with Alex Imas and Alistair Wilson)

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Ego utility in tournament preferences”

“Reservation price strategies in search problems”

“Competing in Information Acquisition and the Effect of Regulation” (joint with Evan Permont and Justin Stewart)

“Cognitive Priming” (joint with Santiago Acerenza and Nestor Gandelman)

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD

Research Assistant in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, 2014-present
Research Assistant to Prof. David Huffman, University of Pittsburgh, Summer 2016
Research Assistant to Prof. Nestor Gandelman, Universidad ORT Uruguay, 2010-2012

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor

Principles of Economics, Universidad ORT Uruguay, Fall 2011
Decision Making Models, Universidad ORT Uruguay, Fall 2011
Principles of Economics, Universidad ORT Uruguay, Spring 2012
Decision Making Models, Universidad ORT Uruguay, Spring 2012
Game Theory, University of Pittsburgh, Summer 2016
Overall Teaching Effectiveness: 4.33/5
Game Theory, University of Pittsburgh, Summer 2017

Teaching Assistant

Industrial Organization, Universidad ORT Uruguay, Spring 2011
Introduction to Microeconomics, University of Pittsburgh, Fall 2013
Introduction to Macroeconomics, University of Pittsburgh, Spring 2014
Overall Teaching Effectiveness: 4.46/5
Introduction to Microeconomics, University of Pittsburgh, Summer 2015

Note: Overall Teaching Effectiveness reported whenever available.

WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS

“The Effect of Subjective Information in Hiring Decisions” (*Job Market Paper*)
(Joint with Mark Azic)

Information gathered throughout hiring processes has a great degree of subjectivity. Most job interviews include a cluster of questions that could be evaluated in very heterogeneous ways by different decision maker, even though its effects various aspects of the labor market are unknown. Using a simulated labor market experiment, we explore the effect of subjective information in hiring decisions. We find that subjective information changes the overall valuation managers assign to worker profiles, but it doesn't improve the hiring results. Furthermore we find that subjective information strongly reduces the well-known bias in favor of male workers when it comes to hiring for a stereotypically male tasks. This implies that subjective information is a potentially useful tool in combating discrimination. Finally, we find that experienced managers obtain worse results when subjective information is part of the workers' profile.

“Preference reversals between one-shot and repeated decisions: The case of regret.” (joint with Alex Imas and Alistair Wilson)

Many of the important choices humans make are recurring, involving feedback from prior choices and opportunities for learning. Yet much of our understanding of human behavior comes from studies conducted in one-shot, static settings. In this paper, we demonstrate the potential pitfalls of such extrapolation, focusing on the case of regret as an illustrative example. Under regret theory, decision-makers derive utility both from the outcome of their chosen action and the counterfactual. Evidence for anticipatory regret aversion has been found in one-shot settings, with “regret lotteries” that provide

counterfactual information being valued higher than standard lotteries. These one-shot findings have motivated a literature that advocates the use of regret as a policy tool to boost incentives for behaviors such as exercise and drug adherence, very often as recurrent decisions. However, differences in learning opportunities and the interaction between anticipated and realized regret make the consequences of regret in repeated settings far from clear outside of the one-shot construct. Through a series of controlled experiments, we replicate the one-shot result that regret lotteries are superior to standard lotteries as an incentive. In contrast, for repeated decisions, the pattern *reverses*, with regret lotteries valued significantly less than standard lotteries, from the very first decision onwards. Our results serve to highlight construct validity issues that can arise when extrapolating behavioral effects from one-shot to repeated settings.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

“Ego utility in tournament preferences”

Tournaments are widely used as an incentive mechanisms and their optimal structures regarding incentives for effort provision and risk sharing have been extensively studied; but tournaments can also be the sole source of relative performance feedback when the ranking of all participants is not common knowledge. This may in turn result in a higher ex-ante utility for the participants of tournaments with a low number of winners, since the more people rewarded by the tournament, the more negative the signal is for the unrewarded participants. I propose an experiment that would test the effect of expected relative performance feedback on the preference over the number of winning participants in a tournament.

“Reservation price strategies in search problems”

This project aims to study the effectiveness of commitment devices in stationary search problems, where a cutoff strategy is optimal. It has been shown experimentally that a high proportion of subject facing these problems err in their strategy selection by varying their target throughout the search. I propose an experiment that would test the effect of different treatments that force the subjects to select and/or follow through cutoff strategies in initial rounds of the game on their understanding and effective use of these strategies as commitment devices in later rounds.

“Competing in Information Acquisition and the Effect of Regulation” (joint with Evan Permont and Justin Stewart)

In this paper we propose a novel information structure that more closely aligns to information acquisition in loan and credit markets. The information structure is composed of deterministic signals representing a filtration of the type-space. We embed this model into a game theoretic context.

“Cognitive Priming” (joint with Santiago Acerenza and Nestor Gandelman)

This project shades light on the relation between certain cognitive abilities tests and economic rationality. Using Frederick’s (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test we seek to establish the existence of "Cognitive Priming". This can be done by evaluating the impact of the test over a game by varying its placement in the experimental session relative to the game. The game used is the p-Beauty Contest Game which is strongly related to cognitive hierarchy theory. The game allows to elicit a measure of rationality of the players. Thus, we would able to test causality going beyond simple correlation between cognition and economic rationality.

HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Arts and Sciences Graduate Summer Fellowship, 2014
Arts and Sciences Graduate Fellowship, 2012-2013
Academic Excellence Award, Universidad ORT Uruguay, 2011

SKILLS

Languages

Spanish: Native language
English: Proficient
German: Basic

Software and Programming

Stata, MatLab, Javascript, HTML, z-Tree, L^AT_EX

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Date of Birth: October 3, 1982 **Gender:** M **Citizenship:** Uruguay (F-1 Visa)

REFERENCES

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